H1N1 influenza and the Australian macroeconomy by Verikios, George et al.
H1N1 influenza and the Australian macroeconomy 
 
George Verikios 
Centre of Policy Studies 
Monash University 
 
James M. McCaw, Jodie McVernon 
Vaccine and Immunisation Research Group 
Murdoch Childrens Research Institute and 
Melbourne School of Population Health 
The University of Melbourne 
 
Anthony H. Harris 
Centre for Health Economics 
Monash University 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Early 2009 saw the emergence of an H1N1 influenza epidemic in North America that 
eventually spread to become the first pandemic of the 21st century.  Previous work has 
suggested that pandemics and near pandemics can have large macroeconomic effects on 
highly affected regions; here we estimate what those effects might be for Australia.  Our 
analysis applies the MONASH-Health model: a computable general equilibrium model of 
the Australian economy.  We deviate from previous work by incorporating two important 
short-run mechanisms in our analytical framework: quarterly periodicity and excess 
capacity.  The analysis supports the assertion that an H1N1 epidemic could have 
significant short-run macroeconomic effects but the size of these effects is highly 
dependent on the degree of inertia in the markets for physical capital and labour. 
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1.  Introduction 
 April 2009 saw the emergence of an H1N1 influenza (swine flu) epidemic in North 
America that eventually spread to become the first pandemic of the 21st century.  By January 
2010, H1N1 activity had peaked in most regions of the world but intense pandemic activity was 
still being observed in North Africa, Southern Asia, and parts of East and Southeast Europe.  The 
pandemic had ended by August 2010, by which time there had been laboratory confirmed cases 
of swine flu in over 214 countries and, at least, 18,449 deaths (WHO 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).1  In 
Australia, there had been 37,562 confirmed cases of swine flu and 191 deaths by the middle of 
summer (January) 2010, by which time national influenza activity was low (DHA 2010).  
 A measure of the relative severity of the epidemic in Australia is given by two indicators.  
Relative to other southern hemisphere countries, Australia’s crude rate of confirmed cases per 
100,000 population was very high at 166.7; this compares to 74.1 in Chile, 72.8 in New Zealand, 
and 20.7 in Argentina.  Australia also compares unfavourably to northern hemisphere countries 
on this measure; 21.6 in the UK, 21.1 in Mexico, and 12.5 in the USA.  Australia compares more 
favourably in terms of hospitalisations per 100,000 population at 21.4.  Similar rates were 
observed in New Zealand (22.7), and Argentina (22.1), but there were much lower rates in Chile 
(9.1), Canada (4.4), the USA (3), and the UK (2.7).2  Of the number hospitalisations, 13% were 
in intensive care units (ICUs) and this was much higher than expected (Bishop 2009).  Overall, 
these measures indicate that with respect to other countries in 2009, Australia’s H1N1 epidemic 
can be regarded as relatively severe.  The reported numbers of cases per capita were high, 
reflecting intensive case finding efforts in the initial phases of the pandemic response, and ready 
access to laboratory testing resources around the country. 
 In 2003 there was a near pandemic of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome); 
analyses of this episode estimated very large temporary economic effects in highly affected Asian 
regions (Chou et al. 2004; Hai et al. 2004; Lee and McKibbin 2004).  This suggests that the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic might also have had large temporary economic effects on highly affected 
regions.  Our objective is to estimate what those effects might be for Australia with a focus on the 
macroeconomic adjustments that would take place in response to the epidemic.  Thus, we take an 
economy-wide approach to estimating the economic impacts of an H1N1 pandemic.  Beutels et 
al. (2008), Lee and McKibbin (2004), and Smith et al. (2005) argue convincingly that economic 
analysis of public health emergencies of international concern (e.g., H1N1 influenza and SARS) 
should not take a partial equilibrium approach by focussing on only the health sector (or parts of 
the health sector) and forgone incomes resulting from disease-related morbidity and mortality, 
while ignoring effects in other parts of the economy (e.g., Sander et al. 2009).  Illness and death 
due to public health emergencies raises perceptions of risk and leads to risk-modifying behaviour 
in an effort to reduce the risk of contracting illness, e.g., prophylactic absenteeism from work and 
public gatherings.  Risk-modifying behaviours affect consumption and reduce labour 
productivity.  Deaths due to illness reduce the availability of workers.  Both of these effects will 
affect all parts of the economy to a greater or lesser extent.  Further, Lee and McKibbin (2004), 
and Smith et al. (2005) show that the effects on the non-health sectors due to SARS and 
antimicrobial resistance are larger than the effects on the health sector.  Thus, an economy-wide 
                                                 
1 To quote WHO (2010b), “The reported number of fatal cases is an under representation of the actual numbers as 
many deaths are never tested or recognized as influenza related.”  
2 These figures are as at September 2009. 
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approach is the ideal framework for properly evaluating the economic impacts of public health 
emergencies such as H1N1 influenza.   
 Our economy-wide analysis applies the MONASH-Health model of the Australian 
economy.  MONASH-Health is a detailed, dynamic, computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of the Australian economy.  The theoretical structure of MONASH-Health is similar to 
that of the MONASH model of Australia (Dixon and Rimmer 2002).  MONASH-Health places 
special emphasis on the health sector to aid economic analysis of health sector issues.  The health 
sector detail allows us to carefully target the increased demand on health services that an H1N1 
epidemic would be expected to cause, while the general equilibrium nature of the model allows 
us to capture the indirect effects of the epidemic on the non-health sectors. 
 In applying the MONASH-Health model to analyse the economic effects of a H1N1 
pandemic, we deviate from previous work in three important respects.  First, three separate 
tourism sectors are identified in the model: domestic, inbound and outbound.  Previous 
experience with the SARS epidemic indicates that international tourism is strongly negatively 
affected by epidemics of this kind (Pine and McKercher 2004; Wilder-Smith 2006).  Identifying 
international tourism separately in the model allows us to target the likely negative effects on 
international tourism of a flu pandemic accurately.  Second, MONASH-Health is modified for 
quarterly periodicity; quarterly behaviour is an uncommon characteristic of CGE models.  This 
modification is important because pandemics tend to be of short, sharp duration.  An annual 
model tends to smooth out short-term effects leading to potential underestimation of disruption.  
Third, MONASH-Health has the real world feature of inertia in the labour market (sticky real 
wages) to which we add the complementary feature of non-instantaneous price responses in the 
physical capital market (excess capacity).  This allows us to avoid the assumption of full capacity 
utilisation (common in CGE models) in the presence of a demand contraction (such as a 
pandemic) that leads to the prediction of a strong export upturn in the short-run; Dixon and 
Rimmer (2010) show that this is an unrealistic response to a demand-contracting shock.  
Incorporating both quarterly periodicity and excess capacity represents a major development for 
CGE modelling in that is captures important short-run, real world macroeconomic mechanisms.  
This makes our framework ideal for assessing how an influenza pandemic affects the 
macroeconomy.   
 Applying the MONASH-Health model, we simulate the economic effects of two H1N1 
epidemics in Australia: the 2009 outbreak and a significantly more severe episode.  To represent 
the epidemiology of the two episodes we apply the classic Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-
Removed (SEIR) model of infectious disease transmission (Kermack and McKendrick 1927; 
Anderson and May 1992).  Our method is to calibrate the SEIR model on the 2009 epidemic and 
predict the effect on the economy as whole using MONASH-Health.  Based on the underlying 
characteristics of the 2009 epidemic from the SEIR model, we predict the effect of a stronger 
epidemic (with a higher number of infections) on the economy as a whole, taking account of its 
direct impact on health care, labour markets and the consumption of non-health goods as well as 
the indirect effects through macroeconomic variables including capital flows and the exchange 
rate.   
 There are a number of previous studies focussing on the economy-wide effects of global 
pandemics: some of these studies use macroeconomic (i.e., single sector) models.  These include 
Fan (2003), Jonung and Roeger (2006) and Keogh-Brown et al. (2010).  These studies have the 
advantage of applying quarterly models that allow them to capture the short, sharp nature of 
pandemics; they have the disadvantage of a single-sector approach that ignores sectors that are 
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particularly relevant to the study of the economic effects of epidemics (e.g., medical services, 
inbound and outbound tourism).  Other studies apply a CGE (i.e., multi-sector) approach.  These 
include Lee and McKibbin (2004), Chou et al. (2004) and McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006).  
While these studies apply models that have the advantage of identifying multiple sectors in the 
economy (albeit with a simple aggregated health sector), they are of annual periodicity and so are 
unable to capture the short, sharp nature of pandemics accurately.  Dixon et al. (2010) are unique 
in applying a model with the dual advantage of identifying multiple sectors and having quarterly 
periodicity in analysing the effects on the United States of a serious H1N1 epidemic.  We build 
on Dixon et al.’s framework by applying a model that incorporates multiple sectors, quarterly 
periodicity as well as a detailed representation of the health sector.  
 
2.  The nature of influenza pandemics 
2.1  Overview 
 Detailed epidemiologic observations of influenza in human populations span more than 
100 years, including four well-documented pandemics since the beginning of the 20th century: 
1919, 1957, 1968 and 2009.  The majority of influenza morbidity and mortality is due to seasonal 
strains that circulate each winter in temperate climates and over longer periods in the tropics 
(Nicholson et al. 2003).  Less frequently, the emergence of antigenically novel viruses, often 
through cross-species transfer or reassortant events, can result in devastating outbreaks with large 
numbers of excess deaths in a single season (Doherty et al. 2006).  The relative absence of 
immunity to such pandemic strains results in potential for widespread infection with higher attack 
rates (i.e., infection rates) across the age spectrum, and a greater burden of disease borne by 
otherwise healthy young adults than in inter-pandemic years (Ahmed et al. 2007).  Following the 
first wave of infection, the new pandemic virus typically replaces previously circulating seasonal 
strains to produce annual epidemics in an increasingly immune population (Spicer and Lawrence 
1984), with historical records describing variable patterns of subsequent disease.  In 1918-19, 
multiple waves of infection occurred in a single year, some out of season, while in 1968, more 
severe second than first waves were observed in some populations (Fox and Kilbourne 1973). 
 Precise estimation of death rates due to influenza is made difficult by the potential for 
misclassification of cause of death.  For example, this bias arises when deaths occur in the 
community prior to medical consultation, or result from some other diagnosed cause such as a 
cardiac event that might have been precipitated by underlying influenza (Warren-Gash et al. 
2009). Having recovered from their infection, individuals are less likely to be reinfected with 
related H1N1 strains, and may retain some measure of broad cross-protection against unrelated 
seasonal influenza viruses (Steel et al. 2010). 
2.2  How influenza pandemics affect human behaviour 
 Direct economic effects of illness resulting from influenza include increased healthcare 
expenditures by patients and funders (e.g., governments, insurers), and increased workloads for 
healthcare workers.  Indirect effects include a smaller labour supply due to deaths, and increased 
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absenteeism from work by sick workers and by workers wishing to reduce the risk of contracting 
illness in the workplace, i.e., prophylactic absenteeism.3 
 Prophylactic absenteeism is one example of voluntary risk-modifying behaviour in 
response to a pandemic.  Other examples are reduced domestic and international travel, and 
reduced public gatherings at sporting and other events (CBO 2006).  Non-voluntary risk-
modifying behaviour may be imposed on workers with children by school closures intended to 
mitigate the spread of the virus (Beutels et al. 2008).  Thus, some workers will be forced to take 
leave to care for young children.  Workers who take paid leave from work, whether forced or 
voluntary, reduce their firm’s labour productivity, i.e., output per worker, unless other workers 
can fully replace output lost due to absenteeism.  This may be difficult during an influenza 
pandemic because the virus will be widespread and while many workers may not present to the 
health system, they are likely to be less productive than would otherwise be the case.   
 It is unclear what attitudes firms have towards absenteeism during pandemics, including 
whether they prepare for such events or whether it affects their hiring behaviour.  A related 
question is whether firms utilise workers differently during pandemics, e.g., do they expect 
present workers to work harder or longer to compensate for output lost due to absent workers?  
And do pandemics directly impact investment behaviour by firms?  These issues have not been 
given much attention by pandemic researchers up to now.   
 Fan (2003) asserts that a pandemic will reduce business investment due to increased 
uncertainty and risk, leading to excess capacity.  Similarly, consumer confidence will decline due 
to uncertainty and fear, leading to reduced spending as people elect to be homebound to reduce 
the probability of infection—this is another example of risk-modifying behaviour.  Reduced 
consumer confidence may particularly affect services involving face-to-face contact (e.g., 
tourism, transportation and retail spending).  James and Sargent (2006) argue that evidence from 
past pandemics suggests that it is mainly discretionary spending (e.g., tourism and transportation) 
that is reduced.   
 Fan (2003) also asserts that an epidemic does not need to be of high morbidity and 
mortality in order to exert a large psychological impact on attitudes to risk.  For instance, 
although the 2003 SARS epidemic was characterised by low morbidity and mortality, it did have 
a large psychological impact on attitudes to risk.  Fan (2003) argues that this paradox can be 
explained by: 
 modern communication technology that transmits information almost instantaneously at 
low (or zero) cost; and 
 the lack of adequate medical information on SARS. 
James and Sargent (2006) evaluate this argument by examining evidence from the SARS 
epidemic and agree that people did experience increased fear of infection, e.g., 50 per cent of 
surveyed respondents in Taiwan reported wearing a mask during the height of SARS (p. 22).  
Nevertheless, they argue that the evidence indicates that the only economic impact during the 
SARS epidemic was on air travel to affected locations and related impacts on accommodation.  
Keogh-Brown and Smith (2008) perform a retrospective analysis of the economic impact of the 
                                                 
3 James and Sargent (2006) argue that there is little evidence of prophylactic absenteeism during past influenza 
pandemics.  This stands in contrast to survey results from Sadique et al. (2007) where European respondents 
suggest that 34% of workers would take prophylactic absenteeism measures in the event of an influenza pandemic.   
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2003 SARS epidemic and find that the economic effects were mainly but not exclusively centred 
on East Asian regions, and that the effects went beyond air travel and accommodation. 
 The above discussion serves to illustrate the unsettled nature of researchers’ 
understanding of how influenza pandemics affect human behaviour.  
 
3.  The economic model 
 MONASH-Health is a detailed, dynamic, CGE model of the Australian economy that 
places special emphasis on the health sector to facilitate economic analysis of health sector 
issues.  Its theoretical structure is similar to the MONASH model of Australia: MONASH is 
described in detail in Dixon and Rimmer (2002).  Below we provide a stylised description of 
MONASH-Health.   
3.1  The health sector: treatments and services 
 MONASH-Health contains a detailed representation of the health sector: this represents a 
new development for CGE models.  Previous work in this area usually depicts the health sector 
by subsuming it within a broader sector in either a multi-sector model (e.g., Keogh-Brown et al. 
2009; McKibbin and Sidorenko 2006) or a single-sector model (e.g., Keogh-Brown and Smith 
2010).  A detailed representation of the health sector allows carefully targeted analysis of changes 
in (i) demand for health treatments caused by epidemics or health promotion activities, and (ii) 
supply of health treatments from potential changes in institutional arrangements and other health-
sector reforms.   
 In representing the health sector, 18 health treatments (e.g., cardiovascular disease) are 
distinguished from six health commodities (e.g., pharmaceuticals) and services (e.g., hospitals); 
see Table 1.  The health treatment activities are based on the International Classification of 
Diseases–10th Revision and their absolute and relative sizes in the model data are determined 
using statistics from AIHW (2004).  The health (commodities and) services facilitate the 
provision of treatment activities and are health services that are typically recognisable in detailed 
national accounts data.  Thus, the treatment activities (or industries) employ constant-returns-to-
scale technology using a Leontief (fixed proportions) combination of health services.  Each 
health treatment industry uses a unique combination of health services; this information is also 
sourced from AIHW (2004).  Some treatment activities are pharmaceutical intensive (e.g., 
respiratory system diseases; diabetes mellitus); others are hospital intensive (e.g., injuries; 
neonatal).  Dental services are mainly applied in oral treatments.  Leontief production functions 
fix the pattern of heath services usage by the health treatment industries unless there are changes 
in treatment technologies.  The health treatment industries do not directly demand primary factors 
(land, labour and capital) but are linked to other sectors of the economy via their demands for 
health services as intermediate inputs.  Thus, their demand for primary factors is indirect via the 
demand for primary factors by the industries that produce their intermediate inputs: health 
services (Table 2, column 1).   
 Health treatments are purchased by households as consumption (Table 3): these purchases 
are made at subsidised prices (65%) financed by government revenue.  We make the limiting 
assumption that health treatment exchanges take place in a perfectly competitive market and all 
demands by households are met.  In reality, demands are usually rationed (usually via queuing) 
due to either funding restrictions or capacity constraints.  Further work is required to improve this 
 6
representation of the model; however, we do not feel this limiting assumption impacts the 
application of the model to assessing an H1N1 pandemic.  Households have limited possibilities 
to substitute across health treatments if relative prices change: the own-price elasticities range 
from -0.4 to -0.8.  Expenditure elasticities are mostly greater than 1. 
 
Table 1  Health treatments and health services in MONASH-Health 
Health treatments Health commodities and services 
1. Cardiovascular disease 2. Genitourinary 1. Human pharmaceuticals 
3. Nervous system 4. Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic 2. Hospitals, nursing homes 
5. Musculoskeletal 6. Skin diseases 3. Medical services 
7. Injuries 8. Maternal conditions 4. Dental services 
9. Respiratory system diseases 10. Infectious and parasitic diseases 5. Optometry 
11. Oral health 12. Diabetes mellitus 6. Ambulance services 
13. Mental disorders 14. Neonatal causes  
15. Digestive system 16. Congenital anomalies  
17. Neoplasms 18. Signs, symptoms, ill-defined conditions and other contact with the health system  
 
Table 2  Input-output structure in MONASH-Health (2009 $A billion) 
Industries Inputs 
(1) 
Health  
treatments 
(2) 
Health  
services 
(3) 
Primary 
(4) 
Manufacturing
(5) 
Services 
Totala 
Health treatments 0 1 0 1 7 9 
Health services 70 1 0 1 1 74 
Primary 0 0 19 65 16 101 
Manufacturing 0 6 19 108 205 339 
Services 0 10 17 55 588 669 
Primary factors  0 55 72 94 695 916 
Totala 70 74 127 325 1,512 2,107 
Source: MONASH-Health database.   
a Totals may not sum due to rounding.  
 
Table 3  Sales structure in MONASH-Health (2009 $A billion) 
Commodities 
(1) 
Consumption 
(2) 
Investment 
(3) 
Government 
(4) 
Exports 
(5) 
Imports Total
a 
Health treatments 24 0 0 3 0 26 
Health services 7 0 0 0 -7 -1 
Primary 17 7 1 89 -23 90 
Manufacturing 184 93 0 142 -227 192 
Services 382 177 132 72 -62 702 
Totala 614 277 132 305 -319 1,009 
Source: MONASH-Health database.   
a Totals may not sum due to rounding.  
 
 The health services sectors are treated in a fashion that is more typical of CGE models 
(e.g., Francois and Reinert 1997).  There is a representative firm for each sector that employs 
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constant-returns-to-scale technology using a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) combination 
of primary factors and intermediate inputs.  There is no substitution between the primary factor 
composite and intermediate inputs, and a CES of 0.5 between individual primary factors; 
intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions.  Regardless, health service industries mainly 
use primary factors as inputs and this is dominated by labour inputs (Table 2, column 2).  Their 
outputs are almost exclusively sold to the health treatment industries (Table 2, column 1).  A 
small amount of health services is sold to the representative household (Table 3, column 1); like 
the sales of health treatments, these sales are also made at prices that receive a 65% subsidy.   
 Integrating the health treatment, health services and non-health industries within a single, 
consistent framework allows us to capture the indirect effects of changes in demand for, or 
supply of, the treatment industries simultaneously with the direct effects of any change.  This is 
the major advantage of using an economy-wide model with a health sector focus for analysing the 
economic impacts of health sector changes.  Nevertheless, the output of the health treatment 
industries does not directly impact upon the performance of workers via changes in their health 
status.  Current development of MONASH-Health is exploring such links. 
3.2  The non-health sectors 
 MONASH-Health also contains 35 non-health sectors; Tables 2 and 3 present data on 
these sectors as broad aggregates.  The non-health sectors use their own outputs as inputs as well 
as primary factors.  The non-health sectors in MONASH-Health are treated similarly to the health 
services sectors: there is a representative firm for each sector that employs constant-returns-to-
scale technology using a CES combination of primary factors and intermediate inputs.  
Substitution possibilities across all production inputs mirror those already described for the health 
services sectors.  In contrast to the health services sectors, non-health firms’ outputs can be sold 
to other firms, capital creators (for investment), the representative household, the government, or 
exported (Table 3).  All domestic agents can choose to buy domestically-produced or imported 
goods; this choice is also handled by a CES function.  Ex-duty prices of imports are assumed to 
be fixed.  Exports are assumed to respond to foreign currency prices, which are endogenous.  
Thus, the terms of trade are endogenous and the economy is treated as ‘almost small’.  Total 
household consumption is assumed to be a fixed proportion of household disposable income; 
total government consumption is assumed to be fixed.    
3.3  Dynamic mechanisms 
 MONASH-Health includes three types of dynamic mechanisms: capital accumulation; 
liability accumulation; and lagged adjustment processes.  Capital accumulation is specified 
separately for each industry.  An industry’s capital stock at the start of year t+1 is its capital at the 
start of year t plus its investment during year t minus depreciation.  Investment during year t is 
determined as a positive function of the expected rate of return on the industry’s capital.4  
Liability accumulation is specified for the public sector and foreign accounts.  Public sector 
liability at the start of year t+1 is public sector liability at the start of year t plus the public sector 
deficit incurred during year t.  Net foreign liabilities at the start of year t+1 are net foreign 
                                                 
4 In this application expected rates of return are only a function of current period variables, i.e., capital creators are 
assumed to have adaptive expectations.  We feel this is appropriate for the application analysed here; an H1N1 
epidemic is an event rather than a policy change.  Further, it is a new event of unknown magnitude at the time it 
occurs.  It is difficult to envisage how capital creators could accurately predict future variables affecting the rate of 
return given these characteristics of the epidemic. 
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liabilities at the start of year t plus the current account deficit in year t plus the effects of 
revaluations of assets and liabilities caused by changes in price levels and the exchange rate.  
Lagged adjustment processes are specified for the response of wage rates to gaps between the 
demand for and the supply of labour by occupation.5  Thus, unemployment is endogenous. 
3.4  Model solution 
 The model is represented by equations specifying behavioural and definitional 
relationships.  These can be compactly written in matrix form as 
 A 0=v , (1) 
where  is an matrix of coefficients,  is a vector of percentage changes (or changes) in model 
variables and  is a null vector.  Model variables are divided into two mutually exclusive lists, 
exogenous and endogenous, thus closing the model.  Many of the functions underlying 
A v
0
(1) are 
highly nonlinear.  Writing the equation system like (1) allows us to avoid finding the explicit 
forms for the nonlinear functions.  It also allows us to minimise computational burdens by a 
applying a derivative form of (1) when solving the model; this follows the method pioneered by 
Johansen (1960).  Although the derivative form of (1) is linear, accurate solutions are generated 
by applying multistep solution procedures; see Dixon and Rimmer (2002), pp. 113–18 for more 
details.6 
 In a MONASH-Health simulation of the effects of a pandemic, we run the model twice to 
create the baseline and policy runs.  The baseline is intended to be a plausible forecast while the 
policy run generates deviations away from the baseline caused by the pandemic.  For the non-
health treatment sectors, the baseline incorporates trends in industry technologies, household 
preferences, trade and demographic variables (see Dixon and Rimmer 2002, p.38, for further 
details).  For the health treatment sectors, the baseline incorporates forecasts that have been 
developed from AIHW data outlining expected future demand (quantities) for individual 
treatments (Begg et al. 2007).  Most macroeconomic variables are exogenous in the baseline so 
that their paths can be set in accordance with forecasts made by expert macroeconomic 
forecasting groups (e.g., Australian Treasury).  This requires endogenisation of various 
macroeconomic propensities, such as the average propensity to consume, which then adjust to 
accommodate the exogenous paths for the macroeconomic variables.  
 In the policy run, macroeconomic variables must be endogenous.  Correspondingly, 
macroeconomic propensities are exogenised and given the values they had in the baseline.  More 
generally, all exogenous variables in the policy run have the values they had in the baseline with 
the exception of the variables of interest.  Comparison of results from the policy and baseline 
runs then gives the effects of moving the variables of interest away from their baseline values.  
For the present study, the baseline and policy runs differ with regard to the values given to 
exogenous variables representing an outbreak of H1N1 influenza.  We interpret the differences 
between the results in the baseline and the policy runs as the effects of the outbreak.  
 
 
                                                 
5 This last dynamic mechanism gives MONASH-Health New Keynesian behaviour with respect to the labour market.   
6 The model is implemented and solved using the multistep algorithms available in the GEMPACK economic 
modelling software (Harrison and Pearson 1996).   
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3.5  Model modifications 
 Below we describe important model modifications relating to quarterly periodicity and 
capital idling.  The modifications relating to adding three tourism sectors to the model (domestic, 
international inbound and outbound) are described in Verikios et al. (2010), section 3.5.   
3.5.1  Quarterly periodicity 
 MONASH-Health typically produces annual results (e.g., Brown et al. 2009).  But for this 
work the model has been modified to produce quarterly results.  The modification is important 
because past influenza pandemics have had sharp effects over a short period (e.g., 3-6 months).  
An annual model tends to smooth out such effects leading to potential underestimation of 
disruption.  For example, if an epidemic caused an 80% loss of inbound international tourism 
within a particular quarter, then the adjustment path of the tourism industry would be quite 
different from that in a situation in which international tourism declined by 20% for a year.  
Similarly, a 20% increase in a single quarter in demands for medical services related to infectious 
diseases would place more stress on the medical system than a 5% increase spread over a year.  
Fan (2003), Jonung and Roeger (2006) and Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) all apply models with 
quarterly periodicity to analyse economy-wide impacts of pandemics.   
 Annual CGE models like MONASH-Health are commonly solved in a recursive manner.7  
Dynamic-recursive models usually divide time into discrete intervals and economic variables are 
assumed to change at the end of each interval.  Such models take the form 
  Y G X , (2) 
where  and Y X  are the levels of the endogenous and exogenous variables in a period.  
Computations are then carried out according to 
  Y G X X   , (3) 
where  refers to changes from one period to the next.  If we have changes from one year to the 
next for the exogenous variables, i.e., 

X , then to model quarterly changes we must divide these 
changes by four.  Other changes required to move a discrete-time model from annual to quarterly 
periodicity are: 
a) equations must be added that handle quarterly accumulation of stock variables; 
b) the base data for the initial values of lagged variables must be altered to reflect quarterly 
rather than annual lags; and 
c) parameter values in equations describing partial adjustment mechanisms must be altered 
to reflect quarterly rather than annual adjustment.   
We briefly describe (a) and (c) below; see Verikios et al. (2010), section 3.3, for further details. 
Stock-flow relationships 
 Discrete time CGE models with annual periodicity usually have an equation explaining 
end-of-year (y) capital stocks  (for the j-th industry) as a function of beginning-of-year 
capital stocks , and investment 
y
jKE
y
jKB
y
jI  and depreciation in the current year.  Movements in  
y
jKB
                                                 
7 The exceptions are intertemporal models that compute results simultaneously for all time periods (e.g., McKibbin 
and Wilcoxen 1999; Malakellis 2000).   
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are set to reflect the annual growth rate of the capital stock in the initial solution (i.e., the initial 
data).  yjI  will usually be a function of rates of return on capital.  We add an equation explaining 
end-of-quarter (q) capital stocks  as a function of beginning-of-quarter capital stocks , 
and investment 
q
jKE
q
jKB
q
jI  and depreciation in the current quarter.  Movements in  reflect the 
quarterly growth rate of the capital stock in the initial solution, and 
q
jKB
4q yj jI I .  Thus, the 
relationship between rates of return on capital and investment is still an annual one even though 
the periodicity of the model is now quarterly.  This assumes that firms still make investment 
plans over a one year time horizon but only one quarter of those plans come online in the current 
quarter.  Thus,  and yjKE
y
jI  are never realised, they are only planning variables.   
 Similar changes to those described above for the capital accumulation relationships are 
also made to the stock-flow relationships for debt, credit and equity.   
Partial adjustment mechanisms 
 MONASH-Health contains an equation that controls the deviation of employment from 
the baseline whereby it is assumed that in policy simulations the deviation in the real wage from 
the basecase level increases at a rate that is proportional to the deviation in the gap between 
employment and labour supply from its basecase level:   
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                  t,  . (4) 
In (4),  and  are the real wage rates in year t in policy and baseline simulations,  and 
 are employment and labour supply in year t in the policy simulation, 
tW tbW
tE
tLS tbE  and  are 
employment and labour supply in year t in the baseline simulations, U  is a slack variable set 
exogenously at zero, and 
t
bLS
t
  is a positive parameter.   
 The relationship between real wage and employment deviations from baseline is 
controlled by  .  If   is zero, the real wage stays at its baseline level regardless of labour 
market conditions in the current period; if   is one, the real wage responds flexibly to clear non-
zero excess demand for labour in the current period.    is usually calibrated so that the 
employment deviations of a shock to the economy are approximately zero after about five years, 
e.g., 0.5  .8  In a quarterly model we wish this relationship to continue to hold.  So we divide 
the parameter by four so that the employment deviations of a shock to the economy are 
approximately zero after about twenty quarters, e.g., 0.125  .   
3.5.2  Capital idling 
 The discussion in Section 2.2 noted the importance of risk-modifying behaviour during 
pandemics that leads to reductions in demand (e.g., tourism and transportation).  Previous 
analysis has found reductions in demand to be an important part of the negative shock to the 
economy from pandemics, e.g., Keogh-Brown et al. (2010).  But these analyses have assumed 
full capacity utilisation despite the fact that variation in capacity utilisation is a prominent feature 
                                                 
8 This labour market assumption is consistent with conventional macroeconomic modelling in which the NAIRU is 
exogenous.  It is also compatible with search models and efficiency-wage theory.  
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of recessions in Australia (Otto 1999), the US (BGFRS 2010), and most likely other developed 
economies.  Moreover, Otto (1999) provides evidence that demand shocks explain nearly all of 
the variation in capacity utilisation for Australia.  This suggests that modelling capacity 
utilisation may be important in analysing the effects of demand-contracting events.  This view is 
supported by Dixon and Rimmer (2010) in their analysis of the contemporaneous US recession 
using a dynamic CGE model.   
 Dixon and Rimmer (2010) show that assuming full capacity utilisation in each industry 
involves sharp reductions in rental rates on capital in response to reductions in demand.  Lower 
rental rates on capital lead to a net capital outflow and a real exchange rate depreciation; this 
drives an export upturn in the short run.  This is an unrealistic response to a demand-contracting 
shock: for example, this is not a feature of the current US recession.  Such unrealistic export 
responses can only be moderated by allowing for less-than-full capacity utilisation.   
 Variable capacity utilisation has been extensively analysed in various contexts within the 
real business cycle (RBC) literature (Nakajima 2005).  In allowing for excess capacity here, we 
follow Dixon and Rimmer (2010).  Their representation of idle capital is most closely related to 
the RBC model of Cooley et al. (1995) who represent production by a continuum of firms that 
each period decide whether to run a plant or not.  That is, adjustment in capital used occurs along 
the extensive margin.  The basic idea in Dixon and Rimmer (2010) is that capital rental rates are 
sluggishly adjusting mark-ups on variable costs (wages plus materials) that fall in response to 
excess capacity; whereas the typical view of rental rates is that they represent market-clearing 
prices for the use of existing capital stocks.  We implement the former view in the policy run and 
this requires that we distinguish between capital in use  tjKU  and capital in existence  tjKE : 
excess capacity is where .  Thus, capital accumulation relationships are written in 
terms of . 
t
jKE KU tj
jKE
 We allow for sticky rental rates and excess capacity in the policy run only, via 
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, t ; (5) 
where  and  are the rental rates for industry j in quarter t in policy and baseline 
simulations,  is a slack variable, and 
t
jQ
t
jQb
t
jS   is a positive parameter.   is used to implement tjS (5) in 
the policy run only, and to turn off (5) once .  Note also that , tjKE KU tj t ,...t tj jQ f KU  , 
where f is a decreasing function.   
 In (5) the degree of rigidity in the rental price deviation 1
t
j
t
j
Q
Qb
     
 is controlled by  , 
which determines how responsive the rental price deviation is to excess capacity per quarter: it is 
set at 0.05.  This means that if we set all other terms to zero in (5), 10% excess capacity will 
cause a -0.5% rental price deviation from baseline.  This gives rental prices a high degree of 
downward rigidity in the presence of excess capacity, which with all else constant will work to 
remove excess capacity quickly once demand conditions begin to move towards baseline levels.   
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 Two adjustments are also made to the investment function.  First, expected rates of return 
on investment, , will be lower under excess capacity than under full capacity utilisation 
by defining them as   
t
jEROR
 1
t t
jt t
j jt
j
j
j j
KU KU
EROR ROR D
KE KE
                 
tt ,  . (6) 
That is,  will be a weighted average of the rate of return on capital, tjEROR
t
jROR , and the 
negative of the depreciation rate , where the weights are the share of capital in existence that 
is in use and the share not in use.  So we are assuming that capital not in use earns no rental and 
deteriorates at the depreciation rate.   
jD
 Second, demands for additional capacity in quarter t (when demand for capital exceeds 
supply during recovery) are partially met by recommissioning idle capital from period t–1.  The 
appropriate parameter values are set so that around 16.5% of idle capital is recommissioned per 
quarter to satisfy demands for additional capacity; this is equivalent to two thirds of idle capital 
being recommissioned per year.   
 
4.  Influenza scenarios 
 The earlier discussion of previous analyses of pandemics and their potential economic 
effects flagged a number of channels through which an economy could be affected by a serious 
outbreak of H1N1 influenza.  Considering these channels, we decide on four types of economic 
shocks to impose on MONASH-Health to simulate an H1N1 pandemic:  
(1) a surge in demand for hospital and other medical services; 
(2) a temporary upsurge in sick leave and school closures requiring withdrawal of parents 
from the labour force; 
(3) some deaths with a related permanent reduction in the labour force; and 
(4) temporary reductions in inbound and outbound international tourism and business 
travel.  
 We have developed two quantitative scenarios covering factors (1) to (3), to represent the 
‘first wave’ of infection due to a newly emerged pandemic influenza strain; (4) is determined 
separately below.  The scenarios are both constructed from the classic Susceptible-Exposed-
Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of infectious disease transmission (Kermack and McKendrick 
1927; Anderson and May 1992) with allowance for unobserved (mild and non-presenting) 
transmission and pre-existing immunity in a portion of the population.  The number of people in 
the population who are susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R) are described 
by a set of coupled nonlinear first-order differential equations and associated initial conditions: 
 dS IS
dt
  ,  
 dE IS a E
dt
   ,  
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 dI a E I
dt
   ,  
 dR I
dt
 ;  
where  is the production rate of newly-exposed individuals,  is the transition rate from the 
exposed to infectious class (and so 1   is the average duration spent in the exposed class),  is 
the transition rate from infectious to recovered (1   is the average duration of infectiousness) and 
 is the proportion of all infections that present to health service providers (i.e., the proportion of 
infectious individuals that are not mild or non-presenting).  The initial conditions are 
, ,  and    0 1S z  N  0 0E   0 10I   0R zN , where N is the population size and z is 
the proportion of the population immune to infection prior to the onset of the pandemic. 
 The infection rate, driving the S to E transition, is proportional to the product of S and I 
and so the model is nonlinear.  Given an initial reproduction number (the number of secondary 
cases arising from a primary case, given by   ) that is greater than 1, the model will naturally 
show an initial exponential increase in the proportion of the population that is infected.  The 
epidemic peaks when the reproduction number is equal to 1 (i.e., when  S t   ), and then 
declines due to exhaustion of the susceptible pool, returning to a steady state .  The initial 
reproduction number is tuned to provide the desired total number of infections over the course of 
the epidemic.  The time scale of the epidemic is set by adjusting the serial interval 
 0I  
1 1  , 
which is the average time between infection of one individual and subsequent infection of the 
next. 
4.1  Scenario 1: the 2009 H1N1 outbreak 
 Our method is to calibrate the SEIR model on the 2009 epidemic and predict the effect on 
the economy as whole using MONASH-Health.  Thus, the first scenario is calibrated, wherever 
possible, on available data for the 2009 H1N1 outbreak as at October 2010 (DHA 2009).9  A 
number of serosurveys (Gilbert et al. 2010, McVernon et al. 2010) covering the Australian 
population indicate that approximately 11% of the Australian population were infected in the 
course of the 2009 Australian pandemic,10 which is higher than the values used for planning 
purposes in the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (DHA 2008).  
Twelve per cent of the population were assumed to be protected prior to the outbreak, based on 
serological data (McVernon et al. 2010).  The 2.2 million Australians infected with H1N1 
experience symptoms over 2009:2–2009:4 (i.e., quarters 2–4 of 2009).  The dynamics of the 
outbreak meant that 87% of all new infections occurred in 2009:3; the shocks to MONASH-
Health described below reflect these dynamics.  In formulating these shocks we have deliberately 
chosen conservative assumptions that give smaller economic disruptions.  We feel this is 
appropriate given the unsettled nature of researchers’ understanding of how influenza pandemics 
                                                 
9 DHA (2009) is our source for data available as at October 2010.  This data was first published during 2009 but was 
subsequently revised in 2010 after the end of the pandemic.   
10 We include the following multiplicative factors to allow for the influenza-like illness presentation rate to differ 
from the true H1N1 rate: 5 for general practitioners and flu clinics, and 2 for non-ICU hospital admissions.  These 
factors were chosen based on expert opinion and consultation with government during the early phases (May–June 
2009) of the Australian outbreak (see Table 3). 
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affect human behaviour.  Given the scenario parameters, we assume the following shocks to the 
economy. 
(1)  That out of the 2.17 million people who experience symptoms: 1.96 million seek no medical 
attention but spend $5 (2009 dollars) on pharmaceuticals; 0.21 million seek medical attention (by 
visiting a general practitioner or a flu clinic) but are not hospitalised, incurring expenses of $61 
(2009 dollars); 4,305 are hospitalised and survive, incurring expenses of $3,564 (2009 dollars); 
700 are hospitalised and spend time in an ICU, incurring expenses of $85,395 (2009 dollars), of 
which 506 survive and 194 die.11, 12  The presentation venues for the 2.17 million symptomatic 
individuals have been chosen to reflect the official Australian presentation counts.  Table 4 shows 
the assumed proportional split of influenza-like illness (ILI) presentation to different venues, and 
the values are calibrated to reproduce the 2009 Australian experience.  Altogether medical 
expenses are $100 million (2009 dollars) incurred over May–December 2009.  This amounts to a 
6.3% increase in demand for medical services relating to respiratory treatments over 2009:2–
2009:4.  In MONASH-Health, respiratory treatments are mainly composed of four inputs: human 
pharmaceuticals, hospitals and nursing homes, medical services, and ambulance services.  Thus, 
it is these services whose demand will be mostly affected by the increased demand for respiratory 
treatments.  We assume that demand for respiratory treatments returns to normal in 2010:1. 
(2)  That workers miss a total of 1.44 million workdays over 2009:2–2009:4 on account of their 
own sickness including 0.4 million days while caring for children who are either sick or kept 
home by school closures.  This assumes: 0.5 workdays are lost per working age person who 
experiences symptoms and seeks no medical attention; 2.4 workdays are lost per working age 
person who seeks medical attention (by visiting a general practitioner or a flu clinic); 13.9 
workdays are lost per working age person who is hospitalised.  Working parents caring for 
homebound children are assumed to miss a comparable number of workdays except in the case of 
hospitalisation where half as many days are missed.13  Workdays lost by parents while caring for 
children are scaled for the share of families with all parents working (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2009).  The total loss in workdays translates to a reduction in labour productivity of 
0.22% (= 1.44 million days out of the 646 million days available from 10.77 million workers 
supplying 60 days each quarter).  We assume that labour productivity returns to normal in 
2010:1.  Note that our workday losses assume neither prophylactic absenteeism nor lower 
productivity by workers who may not present to the health system but will be less productive 
than would otherwise be the case, both of which would increase the workday losses.   
(3)  That of the 194 persons who die, 78 are workers.  This translates into a permanent reduction 
in the labour force of 0.0007% over 2009:2–2009:4.   
                                                 
11 The per unit costs for each type of H1N1 case are determined as follows: pharmaceutical cost is representative of a 
generic over-the-counter symptomatic relief flu medication; general practitioner and flu clinic cost is the cost of a 
standard doctor visit in 2009; hospital cost is the cost of a standard hospital visit in 2009; ICU cost is based on 
estimates from Higgins et al. (2011). 
12 When the 2009 outbreak occurred the government announced an H1N1 vaccination program; our expenditure 
estimates do not include vaccination expenditure due to the lack of available data. 
13 Per capita workday losses (for workers and parents) were estimated by Molinari et al. (2007) for working age 
people (18-64 years) in their study of seasonal influenza in the US; their estimates take account of workforce 
participation rates.   
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Table 4  Key parameter values for the simulated epidemics in scenarios 1 and 2 
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Comment 
Percentage of population 
infected with H1N1 and 
displaying symptoms 
11 30 
Percentage of H1N1 cases that 
are mild 
95 75 
Percentage of H1N1 cases that 
are moderate 
4 15 
Percentage of H1N1 cases that 
are severe 
1 10 
Non-presenting, GP, flu clinic 
split for mild cases (%) 
99, 0.5, 0.5 99, 0.5, 0.5 
Non-presenting, GP, flu clinic 
split for moderate cases (%) 
90, 5, 5 90, 5, 5 
Scenario 1: parameter values are based, 
wherever possible, on estimates from the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic in Australia (DHA 
2009).  Where data were unavailable, 
historical (20th century) influenza 
pandemics, published pandemic 
preparedness modelling studies and 
expert opinion are used to inform the 
choices.   
Scenario 2: parameter values are based on 
the assumption that the proportion 
infected with H1N1 is increased threefold 
relative to scenario 1 and by 50% relative 
to the primary scenario considered in the 
Australian Health Management Plan for 
Pandemic Influenza (DHA 2008).  
Percentage of severe cases 
allocated to GP, flu clinic, 
hospital (non-ICU), ICU 
37.5, 37.5, 21.5, 
3.5 
32, 33, 30, 5 Scenario 1: splits to hospital and ICU are set to reflect actual recorded 
presentations. 
Scenario 2: splits are skewed to reflect 
more hospitalisations.  
Percentage of ICU admissions 
resulting in death 
28 56  
(a further 20% 
of hospitalised 
cases die 
relative to 
scenario 1) 
Scenario 1: as given in DHA (2009). 
Scenario 2: 0.26% of the Australian 
population dies, a value consistent with 
the case-fatality-rate in the Western world 
during the 1918-19 influenza pandemic.  
Total ILI cases per true H1N1 
case at GP, flu clinic, hospital 
and ICU (multiplicative factor) 
5, 5, 2, 1 5, 5, 2, 1 Based on early findings of a surge in ILI (non-H1N1) presentations to these 
venues, presumably due to heightened 
public awareness and concern. 
 
(4)  We assume that during the three peak quarters of infection and cost that inbound and 
outbound tourism are negatively affected.  Here we follow previous estimates of the effects of 
SARS and the Iraq war on Australian tourism for 2003 by Dwyer et al. (2006).  Given that these 
estimates are for both the effects of SARS and the Iraq war, we conservatively assume half the 
effects estimated by Dwyer et al. (2006), i.e., during the first two peak quarters of infection 
(2009:2–2009:3) that inbound tourism is negatively affected by 9.2% and 2.2%.  For outbound 
tourism (including business travel), we think it reasonable to posit that some potential Australian 
travellers would be dissuaded from international travel by fears of becoming symptomatic on 
vacation.  Thus, we assume that the outbound tourism effect is half that of the inbound effect.  
Tourism numbers stay at their recessed levels in 2009:4 and then recover smoothly to their 
baseline levels over 2010:1–2010:2.  Australians who cancel their outbound tourism redirect their 
purchases to other goods.  This is an optimistic assumption; a pessimistic assumption is that 
consumers save their money until the pandemic ceases.   
 Note that part of the shocks for scenario 1, in terms of increased demand for medical 
services and absenteeism, are not too dissimilar to the expected shocks that would occur every 
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year due to influenza and ILIs.  So the true impact on demand for medical services and 
absenteeism may be somewhat less than we have predicted.   
4.2  Scenario 2: a severe H1N1 outbreak 
 Based on the underlying characteristics of the 2009 epidemic from the SEIR model, we 
predict the effect of a stronger epidemic (with a higher number of infections) on the economy as a 
whole.  Thus our second scenario is based on a severe H1N1 outbreak assumed to occur during 
the same period as scenario 1, i.e., 2009:2–2009:4, and similar to the more severe scenarios 
considered in modelling work that informed the Australian Health Management Plan for 
Pandemic Influenza (AMHPPI).  The proportion infected with H1N1 is increased to 30% of the 
population or 6 million individuals, a 50% increase over the baseline case assumed in the 
AMHPPI and a three-fold increase over that observed in 2009.  To account for non-H1N1 ILIs, 
the total number of symptomatic infections is 8.1 million.  Given the scenario parameters, we 
assume the following shocks to the economy.  
(1)  Out of the 8.1 million people who experience symptoms: 5.3 million seek no medical 
attention but spend $5 (2009 dollars) on pharmaceuticals; 2.6 million seek medical attention (by 
visiting a general practitioner or a flu clinic) but are not hospitalised, incurring expenses of $61 
(2009 dollars); 180,000 are hospitalised and survive, incurring expenses of $3,564 (2009 dollars); 
64,000 are hospitalised and spend time in an ICU, incurring expenses of $85,395 (2009 dollars), 
of which 11,000 survive and 53,000 die (see Table 4 for the proportional breakdown of 
presentations).  Altogether medical expenses are $2.4 billion (2009 dollars) incurred over May–
December 2009.  This amounts to a 154% increase in demand for medical services relating to 
respiratory treatments during the period 2009:2–2009:4.  We assume that demand for respiratory 
treatments returns to normal in 2010:1. 
(2)  That workers miss a total of 7.9 million workdays over 2009:2–2009:4 on account of their 
own sickness and a further 3.8 million days while caring for children who are either sick or kept 
home by school closures.  The total loss in workdays translates to a reduction in labour 
productivity of 1.8%.  We assume that labour productivity returns to normal in 2010:1.   
(3)  That out of the 53,000 persons who die, 21,000 are workers.  This translates into a permanent 
reduction in the labour force of 0.19% over 2009:2–2009:4.   
(4)  That inbound tourism falls by 39% over 2009:2–2009:4 and then recovers smoothly to its 
basecase level over the next four quarters.  In setting the shocks for inbound tourism we 
considered the experience in Asia during the SARS epidemic of 2003.  This episode suggests that 
regions suffering a widespread influenza infection could incur reductions in inbound tourism in 
the range of 20%–70% during the peak infection period (Pine and McKercher 2004; Wilder-
Smith 2006).  For our hypothetical severe H1N1 epidemic, we adopt a number towards the lower 
end of this range (39%).  As in scenario 1, we assume that the outbound tourism (and business 
travel) effect is half that of the inbound effect over 2009:2–2009:4.  Outbound tourism then 
recovers smoothly to its basecase level over the next four quarters.  Australians who cancel their 
outbound tourism redirect their purchases to other goods.   
 Although both scenarios simulate a global H1N1 pandemic, we are unable to explicitly 
apply pandemic shocks to countries other than Australia in our model.  This limitation may 
overstate or understate the extent to which Australia’s international trade in goods and assets is 
affected by the pandemic and the size of the impacts on economic activity.  We cannot overcome 
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this limitation within the present framework but we do flag the importance of this limitation in 
the discussion of our results. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1  Scenario 1: the 2009 H1N1 outbreak 
 The main effects of the 2009 outbreak occur in 2009 and peak in 2009:4, by which time 
GDP and employment are 0.9% and 0.7% below baseline (Table 5); the size of the deviations 
over 2009:2–2009:4 reflect the dynamics of the pandemics in terms of new infection rates per 
quarter.  The decline in GDP relative to employment reflects the loss in labour productivity.  On 
average through 2009, the epidemic reduces GDP and employment by 0.5% and 0.4%.  Through 
2010, GDP is a little lower even though employment is unchanged.  This reflects the slow return 
to full capacity after the pandemic ends; thus capital in use is 0.2% below baseline through 2010. 
 
Table 5  Scenario 1 effects (percentage deviation from baseline) 
2009 2010 Variable 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Average Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Average
GDP -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Employment -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Capital in use -0.3 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Capital in existence 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Investment -0.2 -1.2 -2.1 -0.9 -1.9 -0.6 0.1 0.1 -0.5 
Consumption -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
Exports -1.0 -1.5 -1.1 -0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Imports -0.7 -1.3 -1.5 -0.9 -0.8 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
 
 The epidemic reduces investment by 0.9% through 2009.  In 2009:2 investment falls 
below baseline (-0.2%) because demand-contracting (tourism) and cost-increasing (labour 
productivity) shocks reduce the rental value of capital.  This damps expected rates of return and 
thereby reduces investment.  In 2009:2 the epidemic causes excess capacity to appear in some 
industries (Figure 1), particularly those related to tourism and construction.  Excess capacity in 
2009:2 has a strongly negative effect on investment in 2009:3.  Weak investment in 2009:3 
causes further excess capacity to appear, explaining weak investment in 2009:4.  In 2010:1, much 
of the pick up in demand for capital associated with the recovery in labour productivity and the 
start of the recovery in tourism is satisfied by working down the excess capacity that appeared in 
2009:2–2009:4.  With excess capacity peaking in 2009:4, investment starts to move back towards 
baseline in 2010:1.  This is because excess capacity in 2010:1 is declining as capital in existence 
adjusts down and capital in use adjusts up.  By 2010:2, excess capacity is eliminated.   
 Through 2011, Figure 1 shows average deviations for GDP and employment of 0.0% and 
0.1%.  The epidemic-related reduction in employment in 2009 causes real wage rates to be lower 
than they otherwise would have been.  This allows the Australian economy to arrive in 2010 with 
enhanced international competitiveness so that when tourism recovers and the other epidemic-
related shocks disappear, employment and output move above their baseline values.  The 
improvement in Australia’s international competitiveness predicted here is likely to be tempered 
by a global H1N1 pandemic that affects Australia’s trading partners and competitors, i.e., their 
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real wage rates are also likely to move below baseline, but most likely with different dynamics.  
This would make Australia’s exports and domestically-produced goods less competitive than 
suggested by our results here.  It is difficult to account for these trading partner and competitor 
effects in a national model like the one we apply here.   
 Figure 1 indicates the relative importance of the different shocks in determining the 
overall employment effects.  We see that H1N1 deaths have an almost imperceptible effect on 
aggregate employment due to their small number.  Increased expenditure on health services and 
away from other items of household expenditure has slightly larger employment effects: 
employment is a little higher in the short run.  This is because production of medical services is 
considerably more labour intensive than production of most other items of household 
expenditure.  Extra medical expenditures in 2009 have a small negative effect on aggregate 
employment in 2010.  This is a reflection of the wage mechanism mentioned earlier: extra 
employment in 2009 associated with health expenditures weakens the competitive advantage that 
the Australian economy experiences in 2010.  We see that the main drivers of lower employment 
are lost workdays and the fall in international tourism, with each effect contributing roughly 
equally to the overall employment loss of 0.8%.   
 Figure 2 compares our results for scenario 1 with the typical CGE assumption of full 
capacity utilisation (FCU); the differences in GDP effects are stark.  Dropping the assumption of 
variable capacity utilisation (VCU) reduces the peak GDP effect from -0.9% to -0.02%.  As 
discussed in Section 3.5.2, assuming FCU involves sharp reductions in rental rates on capital in 
response to reductions in demand.  Lower rental rates on capital lead to a net capital outflow and 
a real exchange rate depreciation; this drives an export upturn in the short-run.  We see this 
mechanism at play in Figure 2 where under FCU the real exchange rate14 depreciates initially and 
stays below baseline through 2009 and 2010, compared to almost no initial depreciation with 
VCU.  Thus, exports fall less with FCU.  Although exports decline sharply by 2009:3 with VCU, 
reflecting the 8% reduction in inbound tourism, exports begin to recover by 2009:4 even though 
inbound tourism does not fully recover until 2010:2.  The recovery of exports is assisted by the 
real exchange rate depreciation, associated with the peak effect on investment, that begins in 
2009:4.   
5.2  Scenario 2: a severe H1N1 outbreak 
 The severe outbreak has similar dynamics to the 2009 outbreak, and so its peak effect also 
occurs in 2009:4.  Importantly, however, the effects are much larger with GDP and employment 
6.2% and 4.1% below baseline in 2009:4 (Table 6).  These effects are between six and seven 
times larger than the peak effects of the 2009 outbreak.  This is a combination of two major 
differences between the two outbreaks: (i) the clinical attack rate is three times higher in the 
severe outbreak; and (ii) the proportion of infected cases that are moderate or worse is five times 
higher in the severe outbreak.  On average through 2009, the severe outbreak reduces GDP and 
employment by 3.6% and 2.2%.  Through 2010, the economy recovers strongly but is still 
recessed; GDP and employment are 0.7% and 0.4% below baseline.  As observed in the 2009 
outbreak, the recovery is impeded by a slow return to full capacity after the pandemic ends.  The 
slow return to full capacity is impeded here by the slow recovery in tourism numbers through 
2010. 
                                                 
14 The real exchange rate is measured by movements in the Australian price level compared with price levels in 
trading partners expressed in a common currency.  Negative movements in the real exchange rate indicate 
improvements in the international competitiveness of the Australian economy. 
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Figure 1  Scenario 1 effects on selected aggregates  
(percentage deviations from baseline) 
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Figure 2  Scenario 1 effects with variable and full capacity utilisation 
(percentage deviations from baseline) 
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Table 6  Scenario 2 effects (percentage deviation from baseline) 
2009 2010 Variable 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Average Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Average
GDP -2.6 -5.7 -6.2 -3.6 -2.6 -0.5 0.2 0.2 -0.7 
Employment -1.3 -3.4 -4.1 -2.2 -2.6 -0.2 0.6 0.7 -0.4 
Capital in use -2.5 -5.5 -5.8 -3.5 -2.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -1.4 
Capital in existence 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 
Investment -1.9 -8.8 -14.6 -6.3 -12.2 -4.2 0.3 0.6 -3.9 
Consumption -1.8 -4.4 -5.0 -2.8 -2.8 -0.7 0.0 0.1 -0.9 
Exports -6.2 -9.2 -5.8 -5.3 2.4 1.5 0.1 0.5 1.1 
Imports -3.0 -6.8 -8.1 -4.5 -5.1 -1.9 -0.3 0.4 -1.7 
 
 An important contributor to the larger effects in the severe outbreak is the much greater 
peak effect on investment: -14.6% versus -2.1% in 2009:4.  With a much larger fall in 
investment, a much larger level of excess capacity emerges in 2009 (Figure 3).  Like investment, 
excess capacity peaks in 2009:4.  From 2010:1, investment starts to move back towards baseline 
reflecting the beginning of the pickup in capital in use once the pandemic ends.  At the same 
time, capital in existence continues to adjust down.  Excess capacity is eliminated by 2010:3 and 
so investment moves above baseline.   
 Comparing the relative importance of the different shocks in determining the overall 
employment effects (Figure 3), we see that H1N1 deaths have almost no effect on employment in 
the short run but have a small negative effect in the long run.  Short-run results in MONASH-
Health are mainly demand driven and the deaths have little effect on aggregate demand.  In the 
longer run, employment is determined mainly by labour supply: demand for labour adjusts to 
changes in supply via wage movements.  Beyond 2010, H1N1-related deaths in 2009 reduce 
employment by reducing labour supply.  Increased expenditure on health services and away from 
other items of household expenditure has similar effects in the severe outbreak to the 2009 
outbreak: a positive effect on employment in the short run; a small negative effect on aggregate 
employment in 2010. 
 Similar to scenario 1, the main drivers of lower employment are lost workdays (labour 
productivity) and the fall in international tourism, but now lost workdays are much more 
employment-reducing than lower tourism; 3.3% versus 1.6% in 2009:4.  This reflects the 
assumption that the risk-modifying behaviour leading to lower tourism is not assumed to increase 
in direct proportion to infection rates as we move from the 2009 outbreak to the severe outbreak.  
It is not obvious whether this is an appropriate assumption.  Nevertheless, as the simulated effects 
are approximately linear in the shocks, we know that larger tourism effects would lead to larger 
adverse employment effects.  
 Figure 4 shows, as in scenario 1, that the assumption of VCU or FCU leads to very 
different GDP deviations from baseline.  Assuming VCU gives a peak GDP effect of -6.2% in 
2009:4; assuming FCU gives a peak GDP effect of -1.9%.  The mechanism driving this 
difference has been outlined earlier.  The relative differences in peak GDP effects between the 
VCU and FCU simulations for scenario 2 are much smaller than those observed for scenario 1.  
This suggests that the degree of rental price stickiness may be important in determining the depth 
of the trough in economic activity when a pandemic hits (see the parameter   in equation (5)).  
We test this assumption by varying   from its current value of 0.05 through to 1 (Figure 4).  We 
see that increasing the value of   reduces the size of the GDP effect but by decreasing amounts.    
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Figure 3  Scenario 2 effects on selected aggregates  
(percentage deviations from baseline) 
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Figure 4  Scenario 2 GDP effects with variable and full capacity utilisation 
(percentage deviations from baseline) 
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5.3  Systematic sensitivity analysis 
 We are able to test the sensitivity of the results to variations in   and other MONASH-
Health parameters systematically.  Table 7 reports estimated means and standard deviations for 
GDP effects from scenario 2 if the relevant parameters vary symmetrically within a chosen range 
and follow a triangular distribution.  The calculation of means and standard deviations was 
carried out using the systematic sensitivity methods automated in the GEMPACK economic 
modelling software (Harrison and Pearson 1996).  These methods rely on a Gaussian quadrature 
to select a modest number of different sets of values for the varying parameters (DeVuyst and 
Preckel 1997).  The model is solved using each different set of parameter values and the means 
and standard deviations are calculated over the several different solutions of the model.  The 
calculated means and standard deviations will be good approximations to the true means and 
standard deviations provided that: (i) simulation results are well approximated by a third-order 
polynomial in the varying shocks and parameters; (ii) varying shocks and parameters have a 
symmetric distribution; (iii) shocks and parameters do not both vary at once; and (iv) shocks and 
parameters either have a zero correlation or are perfectly correlated within a specified range 
chosen by the user (Arndt and Pearson 1996). 
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Table 7  Systematic sensitivity analysis of GDP effects in scenario 2 (percentage deviation 
from baseline) 
 2009 2010 
 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1. Mean -2.6 -5.7 -6.2 -2.6 -0.5 0.2 0.2 
2. Standard deviation from variation in: 
a. Rental price stickinessa 0.20 0.68 1.16 1.02 0.26 0.08 0.09 
b. Real wage stickinessb, c 0.06 0.23 0.44 0.41 0.21 0.11 0.08 
c. Primary factor substitutionc 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 
d. Export demand elasticityc 0.19 0.32 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.00 
a This is   in equation (5).  It is varied in the range / 20  and *20 .  b This is   in equation (4).  c Varied in the range 
±50%.   
 
 Table 7 presents the estimated means and standard deviations for GDP with respect to 
symmetric, triangular variations in parameters.  Row 1 presents the calculated mean across the 
different solutions and, as expected, it is the same as for the original simulation as reported in 
Table 6.  The other results in Table 7 report the values of the standard deviations as each 
parameter is varied; most parameters are varied by ±50% (see notes to Table 7).  The results 
indicate that our GDP estimates are robust with respect to variations in the elasticity of primary 
factor substitution (row 2c) and the elasticity of export demands (row 2d).  In contrast, the GDP 
effects are rather sensitive to values of the parameters determining the speed with which 
disequilibrium is eliminated in the capital market (row 2a) and labour market (row 2b), i.e., the 
estimated standard deviations are not insignificant compared to the size of the model results.  
This confirms the ad hoc sensitivity analysis of the rental price stickiness conducted in Section 
5.2.   
 The sensitivity of the GDP effects to rental price and real wage stickiness does vary over 
2009:2–2010:4.  The peak effects (2009) are not so sensitive to the degree of rental price and real 
wage stickiness that we cannot be confident of the sign of the GDP effects.  This is not true in the 
year following the peak effects (2010) where the means are only two standard deviations or so 
away from changing sign.  The greater sensitivity of the results in 2010 for rental price and real 
wage stickiness is due to the importance of these assumptions in determining the rebound in 
economic activity above baseline once the pandemic ends.  This is demonstrated in Figures 2 and 
4, which compare the FCU and VCU results for each scenario.  Assuming FCU (i.e., no rental 
price stickiness) removes the rebound above baseline in both scenarios.  Assuming no real wage 
stickiness would have a similar influence.  The sensitivity of the model results to these two 
important parameters should be noted when considering our results.  Nevertheless, it should also 
be noted that both excess capacity and real wage stickiness are real-world phenomena for 
developed economies.  Thus, the empirical issue to be determined is the degree of inertia in the 
markets for physical capital and labour rather than their existence. 
 
6.  Discussion 
 Our results show that the possible GDP effects on Australia of a mild H1N1 pandemic 
(scenario 1) are in the range -0.5% to 0% in the peak year, depending on the degree of capacity 
utilisation assumed.  For a severe H1N1 pandemic, our results range from -3.6% to -1.2%.  The 
results are not directly comparable to most previous studies and, as far as we are aware, there are 
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no studies that have estimated the economic effects of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic for Australia or 
other countries.  There are a number of studies that have analysed past influenza pandemics and 
hypothetical future influenza pandemics.  Most recently, Dixon et al. (2010) estimate the 
economic effects of a serious H1N1 epidemic for the US; their work showed a GDP effect of       
-1.6% in the peak year.  Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) estimate the effects on the UK of the 1957 or 
1968 influenza pandemics could affect GDP by -0.58% in the peak year, and a more extreme 
scenario could increase this to -4.5% or -6%.  The estimates for both of these studies are strongly 
driven by the lost workdays and reduced consumption by households; this is also true for our 
analysis.  Jonung and Roeger (2006) conduct a similar study to Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) but 
estimate the effects of mild and severe influenza pandemics on the European economy: their 
estimates of GDP effects in the peak year range from -1.1% to -4%.  McKibbin and Sidorenko 
(2006) estimate the global effects of a broad range of pandemic influenzas.  For Australia they 
estimate GDP effects of -0.8% to -10.6%.   
 Our peak year GDP effects are within the range of estimates of previous studies cited 
above.  The lower bound of our estimates is smaller than the lowest estimate of the previous 
studies, e.g., 0% versus -0.58%.  Moreover, the upper bound of our estimates is only one-third as 
large as the highest estimate of previous studies, e.g., -3.6% versus -10.6%.  There are differences 
across all these studies including ours.  In terms of the analytical framework, differences relate to 
periodicity, sectoral detail, and capacity utilisation.  In terms of the scenarios modelled, 
differences relate to infectiousness (infection rates), virulence (death rates) and timing.  Further 
differences relate to the nature of the shocks imposed for a given scenario, e.g., the degree of 
risk-modifying behaviour undertaken in response to the pandemic.  This last set of differences is 
legitimate as researchers have well-grounded reasons for assuming different degrees of risk-
modifying behaviour and the response by authorities.  Our approach to estimating pandemic 
responses is conservative and we have adopted responses toward the middle of the range of 
previous studies due to the uncertain nature of the response by people to pandemics.  This 
approach is reflected in the fact that our estimates of economic disruption are low compared to 
previous studies. 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
 We apply a quarterly CGE model to simulate the economic effects on the Australian 
economy of two H1N1 epidemics; the relatively mild 2009 outbreak and a more severe episode 
infecting about 8 million Australians (i.e., around one third of the population).  The use of a 
model with quarterly periodicity rather than the usual annual periodicity allows the analysis to 
capture the short-run nature of influenza pandemics.  Such an event would have its initial 
economic effects concentrated over no more than one or two quarters.  We also deviate from 
previous work in this area by incorporating the real-world phenomenon of excess capacity, and 
we demonstrate its importance when simulating a demand-contracting shock like an influenza 
pandemic.   
 Our analysis shows that an H1N1 pandemic could have significant macroeconomic 
effects.  It is likely that it would reduce household demands for international travel and demands 
by international tourists for hotels, travel and other services within Australia.  It is also likely that 
industries would face increased costs via absenteeism.  Both the demand decreases and cost 
increases associated with an epidemic of the size assumed here could be expected to cause a 
sharp reduction in investment with resulting adverse effects on employment and GDP.  The 
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simulations show reductions in GDP and employment in the peak quarter of 0.9% and 0.7% for 
the 2009 epidemic and 6.2% and 4.1% for a severe epidemic.  Nevertheless, the size of these 
effects is highly dependent on the assumed degree of capacity utilisation and labour market 
inertia.  The analysis also demonstrates that the sharp downturn in economic activity would be 
short-lived with employment and GDP returning to business-as-usual growth rates within two to 
four quarters, depending on the severity of the epidemic.   
 A major contribution of this work is that it represents the first attempt to estimate the 
economic effects on Australia of an H1N1 pandemic.  As far as we are aware, the only previous 
work of this kind is for the US (Dixon et al. 2010) that found significant short-run 
macroeconomic effects from an H1N1 epidemic: our results are consistent with this finding.  
Incorporating both quarterly periodicity and excess capacity also represents a major development 
for CGE modelling is that it captures important short-run, real world macroeconomic 
mechanisms.  This makes our framework ideal for assessing how an influenza pandemic affects 
the macroeconomy.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that our analysis does not take into account 
a number of responses that are difficult to quantify but are likely as the severity of the epidemic 
increases, such as: the reaching of capacity constraints for hospitals in general and intensive care 
units in particular; the change in risk-modifying behaviour as deaths become a much larger 
proportion of population; and the ameliorating effects of policy responses such as vaccination, 
prophylactic anti-viral medications and their costs.   
 Our work points to a number of policy implications for governments, who wish to find the 
best means to minimise the health and social costs of future influenza epidemics, and for 
businesses, who wish to minimise their potential loss of productivity.  Our results demonstrate 
that the macroeconomic effects of an influenza epidemic similar to, or moderately more severe 
than, the 2009 H1N1 epidemic in Australia are significant, but are also likely to be short lived.  
The largest economic impacts of an influenza epidemic are driven by lost workdays, whether as a 
result of illness or formal social distancing measures to contain the epidemic such as school and 
workplace closure; this is consistent with the work of Keogh-Brown et al. (2009, 2010).  These 
findings demonstrate the importance of ongoing appraisal of the severity of an evolving health 
emergency to ensure a proportionate and beneficial national policy response (Bishop et al. 2009).  
These findings further highlight an existing evidence gap regarding optimal application and 
feasibility of stringent distancing measures (even over short periods), with realistic estimation of 
likely impacts on disease transmission (Leung and Nicoll 2010).  Additionally, the benefits of 
private sector preparedness to maintain continuity are reinforced, including protecting workers’ 
health through appropriate infection control and flexible work arrangements, and planning for 
contingency such as the need for childcare arrangements in the event of school closure (DIISR 
2006).  In all, this evaluation suggests that in order to minimise the health and economic impact 
of emerging health threats such as pandemic influenza, there is a need for decentralised 
contingency planning, not just in the health sector, but across the range of activities potentially 
affected (Moss et al. 2011).  
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